sites place "cookies" on their visitors' computers that track use and match personal information across visits. Users routinely reveal personally identifiable information when surfing the web including their Internet addresses and often their personal e-mail addresses as well (Van Name & Catchings, 1996) . "Spamming," the practice of sending unwanted e-mail, often is viewed as misuse of the Internet (Martin, 1996) , prompting preventive measures from Internet service providers (Branscum, 1998; Cranor & LaMacchia, 1998) and from self-appointed vigilantes who delete messages and retaliate against lax e-mail providers (Williams, 1997) .
The methods of pioneering Web survey researchers can exacerbate privacy concerns. One common practice is to cull e-mail addresses from listservs, chat rooms, multi-user games, newsgroups, and personal homepages (Cranor & LaMacchia, 1998; Elmer-Dewitt, 1994; Martin, 1996) . This often provokes retaliation in the form of insulting "flame mail"-with copies sent to the survey organization's senior management-or blitzing the researcher's own return mailboxes. Earlier, e-mail was a novel method and generated high response rates (Parker, 1992) . Recently, potential respondents often decline online surveys on the grounds that they are just another form of spam (Mehta & Sivadas, 1995; Noh, 1998; C. B. Smith, 1997) .
In many comparative studies of e-mail response rates (Bachman, Elfrink, & Vazzana, 1996; Mehta & Sivadas, 1995; Schuldt & Totten, 1994; Sproull, 1986; Tse et al., 1995) , the response rates of e-mail surveys were lower than those of mail surveys and telephone surveys (Table 1 ). E-mail surveys that garner high response rates tend to be done in organizational settings (Parker, 1992; Schaefer & Dillman, 1998; Sproull, 1986; Zelwietro, 1998) . However, organizational users enjoy special protection from unsolicited e-mail. Their addresses are not widely published, and spam often is automatically canceled. Whether researchers can obtain equivalent results from more general, diverse populations has yet to be determined (Bachman et al., 1996) .
The purpose of this article is to define and distinguish the privacy issues raised by online surveys. After developing a better understanding of these issues, we consider research methods and emerging Internet technologies that might make the Internet an acceptably private place through which to conduct surveys. Lee and LaRose (1994) analyzed the correspondence between competing sets of privacy dimensions (Burgoon, 1982; Burgoon et al., 1989; Westin, 1967) . Solitude, or physical privacy, is the state of privacy in which persons are free from unwanted intrusion or observation. Anonymity, or informational privacy, is the desire to have control over the conditions under which personal data are released. The dimension of reserve, or psychological privacy, is defined as the control over release or retention of personal information to guard one's cognitions and affects. Intimacy, or interactional privacy, is relevant to relationships in social units as it preserves meaningful communication between individuals and among group members.
THE DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY
Some of the dynamics of privacy also have been established. Not all privacy violations are equally odious (Burgoon, 1982; Burgoon et al., 1989; Quittner, 1997) . Infringements on informational and psychological privacy are the most offensive (Burgoon et al., 1989) . Invasiveness depends on the type of relationship. Intrusions by acquaintances or strangers, for example, generally are more invasive than intrusions by social intimates (Burgoon et al., 1989) . Individuals desire to withdraw from others at certain times and to be with others at other times, balancing the two needs by managing privacy boundaries to protect identity and relationships (Altman, 1975) .
Privacy violations on the Internet can provoke extreme reactions because the Internet expands the boundaries among the self, social units, and the rest of the world. Turkle (1984) described how the computer becomes an extension of the self. Intrusions in the private cyberspace of our personal computers can violate the privacy boundary between the self and the world in a way that a letter in the mailbox or a telephone call from a stranger does not. Online communities erect their own privacy boundaries through their codes of conduct (Baym, 1997) , and researchers who cross those boundaries risk provoking communal resistance to their efforts.
THE VARIETIES OF INTERNET SURVEYS
Privacy violations can arise from the methods of sampling, contact, and response ( Figure 1 ). Voluntary samples are obtained by solicitations distributed through listservs, discussion groups, and search engine banners (Alexander & Trissel, 1996; Borer et al., 1996; Johnson & Kaye, 1998; Pitkow & Kehoe, 1996; Thomsen, 1996) . Public e-mail directories, including Whowhere and Bigfoot, or organizational e-mail directories (Schaefer & Dillman, 1998; Tse et al., 1995) may be used when voluntary samples are insufficient. Public phone or membership directories may be used to prelist respondents and then look up their e-mail addresses through public e-mail directories (Noh, 1998; Zelwietro, 1998) . Trolling, or the recording of e-mail addresses of participants in newsgroups, chat rooms, and multi-user environments, is another way of compiling mailing lists (Mehta & Sivadas, 1995; Parks & Floyd, 1996) . Others employ guest lists from web sites as sampling frames (Hertz, Zook, Chitwood, O'Carroll, & Friede, 1996) .
Individual e-mail solicitations (Mehta & Sivadas, 1995; Noh, 1998; Parks & Floyd, 1996; Schaefer & Dillman, 1998; Tse et al., 1995; Zelwietro, 1998) involve sending individually addressed e-mail to potential respondents. Group solicitations (Alexander & Trissel, 1996; Borer et al., 1996; Thomsen, 1996) post survey requests to group communication channels such as listservs and discussion groups. Perhaps the best known of all web surveys (Read et al., 1998) relies on public announcements made in a variety of channels. These Noh (1998) 31.4 Opperman (1995) 48.8 Parker (1992) 68.0 38.0 Parks and Floyd (1996) 33.3 Tse (1998) 7.0 52.0 Tse et al. (1995) 6.0 27.0 Schaefer and Dillman (1998) 58.0 57.5 Schuldt and Totten (1994) 19.3 56.5 C. 8.0 (without prenotice), 13.3 (with prenotice) Sproull (1986) 73 include discussion groups that specialize in "Web events," banners placed in popular search engines and ad-supported sites, e-mail lists of interested parties, and trade press publications. Questionnaires sent via e-mail are simply filled out and returned in the same way (Alexander & Trissel, 1996; Mehta & Sivadas, 1995; Noh, 1998; Parks & Floyd, 1996; Schaefer & Dillman, 1998; Thomsen, 1996; Tse et al., 1995; Zelwietro, 1998) , usually by typing in responses in the bodies of the questionnaires themselves. Other online surveys direct respondents to web sites where the questionnaires are located (Borer et al., 1996; Johnson & Kaye, 1998; Pitkow & Kehoe, 1996; Read et al., 1998) . Respondents provide responses on web page forms that present standard survey tasks to them such as check boxes and open-ended response blanks. The responses may be either personal (i.e., containing the e-mail addresses of the respondents) or anonymous. To achieve anonymous responses, e-mail surveys use "anonymizers" that strip the return addresses. Web page surveys may be posted back to the researchers as e-mail. Alternatively, the responses may be written directly to files on the researchers' Web servers using a common gateway interface (CGI) script, providing the semblance of anonymity. However, the researchers still may record e-mail addresses if the respondents have configured their browser software to send e-mail on the web. 
PRIVACY ISSUES IN INTERNET SURVEYS

Physical Privacy
Unsolicited survey requests violate physical privacy (Sudman & Bradburn, 1982) by intruding on the individual's space with sights or sounds. The prenotification and follow-up procedures recommended by survey practitioners (Dillman, 1978) compound the violation by making multiple intrusions. Over time, response rates to conventional surveys are going down as survey requests become more frequent (Dillman, Singer, Clark, & Treat, 1996) and as consumer privacy technology (e.g., answering machines, caller ID, new services that automatically block unidentified callers) and consumer privacy legislation proliferate. The measures that increase cooperation in individual surveys, such as repeat mailings and callbacks, can contribute to the long-term decline in responsiveness to all surveys by multiplying physical privacy violations.
Online surveys disrupt physical privacy in ways that conventional surveys do not. E-mail is personally addressed and thus more invasive than are postal questionnaires addressed to "occupant." E-mail can be accompanied by audio or visual alarms that are every bit as intrusive as a ringing telephone. Whereas phones and postal mailboxes are collectively "owned" by all household members and often reside in public spaces, home computers are in private sanctuaries such as home offices and bedrooms. For users who treat their computers like family members or friends (Reeves & Nass, 1996) or as extensions of their own psyches (Turkle, 1995) , survey requests violate physical privacy as much as do spouses brandishing questionnaires at dinner or "survey request" messages going off inside their heads. Physical privacy violations that require extraordinary effort or resources to respond (e.g., phone survey calls received in the bathtub) are especially onerous. Some Internet users still pay usage fees, making online questionnaires akin to mail surveys with postage due or to phone surveyors who call collect (Martin, 1996) . In addition, there is the cost of time to download and open e-mail and the effort to establish and maintain an Internet connection.
Some online surveys offend by arriving in a space that is not private at all-the workplace. Many users take advantage of fast network connections to answer their e-mail at work, redirecting messages from personal accounts, but responding to survey requests is a violation of corporate policies prohibiting personal use. Even work-related surveys pose an extraordinary risk, that is, that employers will read respondents' electronic answers and punish the employees for violations of corporate information policies. E-mail surveys are not the only offenders. Public announcements of web surveys placed in banners can be an unwelcome sight and, hence, invade physical privacy. Contacts made in group spaces such as chat rooms and discussion groups also are intrusive, although that is an issue of interactional privacy (discussed later).
Informational Privacy
Informational privacy, or the desire to control the movement of personal information (Burgoon et al., 1989; Dunkan, Jabine, & Wolf, 1993) , is a prominent issue in research ethics guidelines (e.g., those of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, the American Psychological Association, the National Institutes of Health), and concerns about informational privacy decrease response rates (Singer, Mathiowetz, & Couper, 1993 ). An important factor in informational privacy is perceived control over the conditions of release, use, retention, and disposal of personal data (Burgoon, 1982; Dunkan et al., 1993; Johnson, 1985) , which is of concern even with conventional data collection methods (O'Harrow, Cho, LaRose / INTERNET SURVEYS 425 1998). Absolute guarantees of anonymity and confidentiality are not always possible in conventional surveys (Greenberg & Garramone, 1989) ; phone surveys can be linked to personal identities through phone numbers, personal interviewers have respondents' addresses, and mail surveys commonly include identification numbers to help manage follow-up mailings (Dillman, 1978) . Ultimately, anonymity and confidentiality are an issue of trust between respondents and researchers (Singer et al., 1993; Singer, Von Thurn, & Miller, 1995) .
Informational privacy violations endemic on the Internet undermine this trust, first, by building on general public apprehension about an uncontrollable flow of computerized personal information (Burgoon, 1982; Irving, 1996; Johnson, 1985; Miller, 1982) . Although interception of e-mail is unlawful (Electronic Communications and Privacy Act of 1995, http://www.wsrv.clas.virginia.edu/~klb6q/infopaper/ecpa. html), it is common knowledge that e-mail can be copied and forwarded with ease, intercepted during transmission, stolen from the receiving server, or recovered from the user's disk drive. Web sites that demand personal registrations and sell personal information (Beiser, 1997; Bernstein, 1997) , use cookies to track visits (Dern, 1997) , link web use to personally identifiable information (Louis Harris & Associates & Westin, 1997) , or trap e-mail addresses from visitors violate informational privacy, as do employers who monitor employee e-mail (Snell, 1997) .
On the Internet, false identities are common (Froomkin, 1997; Turkle, 1996) so that the identities of researchers always are in question. Revelations of weak privacy policies and outright violations of privacy laws by popular web sites (FTC, 1998) have fueled public concern. But even when privacy policies are posted, respondents might not consult them, raising questions about whether notification alone is sufficient. Other sites gather so much data that the sheer volume of information raises privacy concerns. For example, one widely publicized offer gave users free personal computers in exchange for rights to their personal information and web surfing habits and even mandated a monthly minimum usage requirement to ensure that sufficient data were obtained (White, 1999) .
Online surveys employing e-mail as the form of response make informational privacy risks highly salient to the respondent. Respondents' e-mail addresses, and sometimes their names and other personal information contained in e-mail "signatures," are included with the surveys; respondents are well aware of this from the e-mail they receive. Responses collected via e-mail from web forms make the issue more salient by opening "pop up" windows warning that e-mail addresses are about to be transmitted.
Informational privacy might be breached even before the survey request hits the "in box" by the method of sampling. Subscriber lists for most Internet discussion groups and listservs are not public, so samples drawn from them breach informational privacy. Sampling frames acquired by trolling in chat rooms or discussion groups or by viewing personal homepages rely on public information, but participants might not always see it that way. There is a further violation inherent in the ability to match observations of online "public behavior" (e.g., postings to a discussion group) to personally identifying information and to survey results.
Samples developed from web site registrations are less serious violations (provided that they are consistent with the stated privacy policies of the sites) because respondents already have made voluntary disclosures. Such surveys achieve remarkable response rates (Hertz et al., 1996; Stewart, 1998) . However, if a survey deviates from the manifest purpose of the site (e.g., if Martha Stewart asks questions about underarm deodorant products) or if a list is sold to a third party, then a violation of informational privacy is implicit. E-mail addresses sampled from public directories (e.g., Bigfoot, Whowhere) contain information such as homepage addresses and employment not found in phone directories. Moreover, the directo-ries bill themselves in ways (e.g., bringing people together) that create expectations that they will not be used for other purposes such as survey research.
Psychological Privacy
Psychological privacy can be distinguished from informational privacy in that the latter has to do with the degree of control over personal information, whereas the former is concerned with the content of the information, specifically, the degree to which it betrays psychological or emotional states (Burgoon, 1982; Lee & LaRose, 1994) . Psychological privacy is protected by personal choice and the voluntary prudence of others (Burgoon, 1982; Burgoon et al., 1989; Westin, 1967) . Human subjects committee requirements and ethical guidelines for professional researchers address psychological privacy by informing respondents of the nature of the studies and soliciting informed consent. Informed consent about confidentiality procedures has a small but significant positive effect on response rates to surveys dealing with sensitive topics (Singer et al., 1995) .
Psychological privacy is equally a concern in conventional and online surveys. However, for the many reasons already identified in the analysis of informational privacy, these concerns are amplified in online surveys because there might be less perceived control over the information and less trust in the researchers. The close personal relationship that users have with their computers can demarcate the privacy boundary between researchers and respondents in a way that equates some computer usage with our innermost thoughts. Finally, uninhibited expressions of emotional states are common in computer-mediated communication (Dicken-Garcia, 1998; Walther, 1996) . Online surveys that rely on the trolling method to develop their sampling frames or that contact respondents through online communities raise the concern that the researchers have observed uninhibited displays of emotional and psychological states.
Interactional Privacy
One of the reasons why individuals wish to control personal information is to maintain relationships with varying degrees of intimacy with different individuals (Johnson, 1985; Rachels, 1985) , so informational privacy is intricately related to interactional privacy. The willingness to make disclosures of personal information is based on the sensitivity of information and the intimacy of the relationship (Johnson, 1985; Rachels, 1985) . Burgoon et al. (1989) found, for example, that a teacher's privacy intrusion was more offensive than a parent's privacy intrusion. People routinely make highly personal disclosures to professionals (e.g., doctors, lawyers, and, yes, survey researchers) and rely on professional ethics for privacy protection.
Accordingly, in conventional surveys, response rates fluctuate with the attributes of researchers and the authority of survey organizations (Groves, Cialdini, & Couper, 1992) , and trust in the researchers might have a greater impact on response rates than do the confidentiality assurances (Singer et al., 1993 (Singer et al., , 1995 . Interactional privacy also is violated by disruptions of meaningful interpersonal interactions (Burgoon, 1982; Westin, 1967) including phone survey calls and personal interviewers that arrive at the dinner hour.
Trust can be a crucial factor in response rates to online surveys. Schaefer and Dillman's (1998) e-mail survey response rate of 58% was high by online survey standards and was comparable to the response rate of their mail survey. One factor contributing to their success might be the fact that the respondents were faculty of the same university with which the authors were affiliated and that the dean of the College of Liberal Arts sent prenotifications to Cho, LaRose / INTERNET SURVEYS 427 promote responses. Parker's (1992) study, in which the response rate to an e-mail survey (68%) surpassed that to a mail survey (38%), is similar in this regard; the researcher and respondents were employees of the same organization. Internet surveys done outside of such organizational settings are not as trustworthy. As we already have noted, constructed identities are common on the Internet, so online surveys "enjoy" a unique handicap in this regard.
The Internet is home to innumerable online communities that are both intimate and cohesive (Mayer & Till, 1996; Parks & Floyd, 1996; Sharf, 1997; Turkle, 1996) . Each Internet newsgroup, chat room, multiuser environment, and listserv possesses its own conditions of membership and rules for communication. As a matter of "netiquette," new members are advised to acquire a sense of the community's content and style before entering. Many communities have moderators who play the roles of mediator and sergeant-at-arms (Till, 1997) . Thus, online communities nurture interactional privacy among members while erecting boundaries against intrusions by nonmembers. Survey participation requests from a stranger/researcher who does not share the bond of community, therefore, can be invasive (Dunkan, 1996) even when there is nominal "sponsorship" of the study by the moderator, sometimes provoking organized community resistance. The Internet itself, in its global entirety, often is thought of as a community of users, and the values of that community prohibit disrupting the operation of the network or misusing its resources. Surveys that bombard the web with unsolicited e-mail, therefore, are violations of the interactional privacy of the Internet community at large.
CONCLUSION
Thus, privacy is a more sensitive issue for Internet surveys than for conventional survey media. The intimate relationships between respondents and their personal computers and between respondents and the online communities in which they participate create new privacy boundaries that are easily transgressed by researchers. The flexible nature of personal identity and frequent abuse of privacy norms on the Internet mean that the authenticity of online researchers, the purposes of their research, and the credibility of the anonymity and confidentiality guarantees they offer always are open to question.
Which types of online survey methods are the most problematic? Burgoon et al. (1989) found that informational and psychological privacy were the most sensitive of the four privacy dimensions, so methods that raise either or both of these concerns are the most problematic. However, violations of interactional privacy have serious consequences for the researcher because they can prompt group action that can entirely frustrate the conduct of a survey including community boycotts and "hacker attacks" on the researcher's computers by vigilantes acting on behalf of the Internet community. Returning to our typology of Internet survey methods, this means that the worst case would be surveys by researchers who lurk in public Internet spaces where potentially sensitive communication is exchanged or who contact respondents through those channels given that both psychological and interactional privacy violations are being committed. If the form of response also is not anonymous, such as using return e-mail, then there would be a "triple whammy" of informational privacy violations from the form of sampling, contact, and response. However, no method is entirely free of privacy concerns. Volunteer samples that use anonymous replies through web pages (e.g., the Georgia Institute of Technology's Graphics, Visualization, and Usability (GVU) Center studies) maintain all four forms of privacy in their sampling and response formats. However, the banners they circulate to recruit respondents constitute physical privacy violations, albeit probably not as severe as the receipt of unsolicited e-mail.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Experimentation with varying approaches to sampling, contact, and response formats in online surveys is done in order to identify the optimal mix of design options. In the interim, online researchers should minimize overall privacy invasions. For example, if trolling must be used (e.g., to identify members of rare populations), then the informational privacy violation might be offset by choosing a purely anonymous form of response. The following are suggestions for addressing specific privacy concerns that can arise during online surveys.
Separation of the consent from the survey. An online survey typically includes the questionnaire in the same e-mail that delivers the survey request. The standard practice in postal mail surveys is to separate the consent language (i.e., the cover letter) from the survey form (Dillman, 1978) and to provide a prenotification letter. Likewise, an Internet survey should use a prenotification e-mail to seek informed consent. Directing respondents to a web site to complete the survey is another option. Including the survey as an attachment to the e-mail would have the same effect; however, many e-mail systems are not equipped to handle attachments. Electronic prenotice has proven effective in increasing the response rates of email surveys (Mehta & Sivadas, 1995; Schaefer & Dillman, 1998; C. B. Smith, 1997) , but paper pre-notifications might be discarded or forgotten (Schaefer & Dillman, 1998) so that e-mail surveys appear unsolicited and intrusive (Mehta & Sivadas, 1995) . This builds trust (a factor in interactional privacy) while reducing the magnitude of the initial physical privacy violation.
E-incentives.
Incentives offer compensation for a wide range of privacy intrusions. Church's (1993) meta-analysis of the effects of incentives on mail survey response rates indicated that prepaid incentives, either monetary or nonmonetary, had significant positive effects. The growth of electronic commerce affords an opportunity to offer incentives to respondents to online surveys as well. Gift certificates to popular web shopping sites are a current option, and it soon should be possible for researchers to transfer incentive payments to online credit repositories (e.g., http://www.ewallet.com). However, it is possible to offer too much incentive. For example, an offer of a free personal computer in exchange for extensive rights to personal and web usage data (White, 1999) might literally be irresistible to lowincome households, raising questions about the meaningfulness of voluntary participation.
Data collection through web pages. This is the most effective means of separating personal e-mail addresses from the data, and it also has the side benefit of automating the data entry process. The researcher must write a special program for the CGI so that the data are sent directly to an external file. Otherwise, the data are sent from the user's browser in the form of personally identifiable e-mail, often with an accompanying privacy alert issued by the browser software. However, it still is possible to capture e-mail addresses (and to add them to CGI files) if users have enabled their browsers to send e-mail. So, researchers might include promises not to capture e-mail addresses in their confidentiality disclosures.
Multiple response options. For those respondents who still are concerned about informational privacy on the Internet, the alternative response media of mail, telephone, or personal interview can be offered. By providing conventional (i.e., snail mail) mailing addresses, Internet surveys can be printed out and returned via the mail but without respondents' return addresses if they so choose (Schaefer & Dillman, 1998) .
Remailers. Remailers can almost guarantee anonymity by stripping off e-mail addresses from returned questionnaires, and concerned respondents can be directed to them. Unfortunately, some of these sites have unsavory reputations because they often are used for illicit purposes. Remailing software is readily available in the public domain (e.g., http:// www.obscura.com/~loki) so that individual researchers could set up their own remailers, but the remailing node can record incoming addresses, and this would defeat the purpose if run by the researchers themselves. Remailers run by responsible research organizations, such as university human subjects committees and professional research organizations, might be a more credible solution.
No trolling. Researchers who troll for e-mail addresses by observing web communities invade a private space in which users may freely disclose personal information and their innermost thoughts. Trolling is such a severe breach of Netiquette that some Internet access providers (e.g., Ameritech, http://www.ameritech.com) prohibit it under penalty of "Internet death"-cutting off the offender's access. Instead, researchers could use lists for which voluntary disclosures are made for the stated purpose of facilitating contacts with non-group members (e.g., the various Internet white pages). Web communities should be sampled only with group consent.
No cookies. The placement of cookies, or small identifying computer files, on respondents' computers could benefit researchers by enabling them to screen out respondents who attempt to make multiple responses, track respondents, and match data in multiwave surveys. However, cookies raise such serious Internet privacy concerns that they should not be used unless researchers disclose the exact information that is included in the cookies, perhaps by making the cookies' content visible to users. There also is a technical solution to this problem-the state ID, which issues a random number to identify the cookie in follow-up contacts instead of using personally identifiable information (Machrone, 1998) .
No external links from personalized sites. Web server monitoring programs routinely track where each user comes from when they enter a web site. If personally identifiable information is at the linked site, then it could be matched to survey data. Therefore, web surveys should not be linked from sites at which personal information about the users is on file or at which a personal log-in is required, nor should there be outbound links to such sites.
Disclosures. Informational privacy concerns can be allayed by adhering to norms for disclosures of the researcher's identity, organizational affiliations, the purpose of the inquiry, and data retention that are followed in conventional survey research. Simply posting a privacy policy behind a Web link is not enough given that users might not take the trouble to inform themselves. A proactive notice should be provided in the language of prenotification e-mails or in the introductory language for Web surveys. But the ease of falsifying identities on the Internet demands additional assurances. The credentials of the principal investigator or project manager should be available through a link to his or her personal web page, complete with a personal e-mail address. Personalization is important (Dunkan, 1979; Warren, 1984) because assurance of confidentiality is not effective unless people trust it (Singer et al., 1993 (Singer et al., , 1995 . Respondents should be able to verify identity by linking to the researcher's page through an institutional page that respondents are likely to find credible.
Privacy certification. Another means of extending privacy assurances is to obtain certification from third parties that audit online privacy practices. Two that already have been es-430 SOCIAL SCIENCE COMPUTER REVIEW tablished are TRUSTe (http://www.TRUSTe.org) and the Better Business Bureau (http://www.bbb-online.org), although these are geared primarily to regulating the use of personal information collected at commercial sites that might be used for direct marketing purposes. This might be a role that professional associations of survey researchers or university human subjects committees could fill by offering their own stamps of approval. The Platform for Privacy Preferences (http://www.w3.org/p3p) is an initiative of the World Wide Web Consortium that will automate this process. The user will be able to enter preferences for types of information that may be released under varying conditions of privacy assurances. The user's software "agent" then will "negotiate" an exchange of information in relation to the privacy policies of the site that requests the information.
Credible domains. University sponsorship increases response rates (Fox, 1988) in conventional surveys. The Internet domain name system provides a widely recognized and credible means of certifying that a survey request originates from, and survey results are being sent to, a credible university source-the .edu domain identification. Commercial researchers could seek out university collaborators or form alliances with reputable web institutions such as search engines and directory sites.
Encryption. When extremely sensitive material is collected, respondents might have legitimate concerns about its interception before it reaches the researcher, a possibility even when remailers are used. Respondents could be encouraged to encode their replies, an option common to many popular e-mail client programs.
Hypertext disclosures. Elaborate explanations of confidentiality increase response rates only when surveys ask about sensitive topics (Singer et al., 1995) . Unfortunately, what is a sensitive topic for one respondent might not be sensitive to the next respondent, so researchers face a quandary in deciding when to use short versus long disclosures. The fundamental hypertext feature of the web, allowing potential respondents to "click here for more information," provides elaboration on confidentiality procedures for those who need it.
Disclosure of sampling procedures. Online survey researchers should provide clear explanations of how sampling frames were obtained to avoid suspicion that they were obtained through trolling, which is a violation of interactional privacy. This is especially important in surveys of discussion groups whose lists are not readily available. Group message postings should be avoided because they are displayed on the recipients'screens as "to: recipients list suppressed," the same way as a spam mailing addressed to thousands of users would appear.
Community consent. Till (1997) suggested obtaining permission from the appropriate leaders of online communities such as owners and moderators. Personalized letters addressed to individual members of groups might backfire, however, prompting questions about the purposes and ethics of surveys as members communicate with each other. Researchers should observe group norms elaborated in the "frequently asked question" (FAQ) files of Internet communities. Where psychological privacy is a concern, group-level permission could be obtained by asking community leaders to pose the question of participation before providing member lists and to allow dissenting members to opt out. In extremely sensitive situations (e.g., cancer support groups), interested respondents should be asked to opt in by community leaders. Where leaders are not in a position to speak on behalf of the entire
